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The theoretically proven security of quantum key distribution (QKD) could revolutionise how
information exchange is protected in the future[1, 2]. Several field tests of QKD have proven it to
be a reliable technology for cryptographic key exchange and have demonstrated nodal networks of
point-to-point links[3–5]. However, so far no convincing answer has been given to the question of
how to extend the scope of QKD beyond niche applications in dedicated high security networks.
Here we show that adopting simple and cost-effective telecommunication technologies to form a
quantum access network can greatly expand the number of users in quantum networks and therefore
vastly broaden their appeal. We are able to demonstrate that a high-speed single-photon detector
positioned at a network node can be shared between up to 64 users for exchanging secret keys
with the node, thereby significantly reducing the hardware requirements for each user added to the
network. This point-to-multipoint architecture removes one of the main obstacles restricting the
widespread application of QKD. It presents a viable method for realising multi-user QKD networks
with resource efficiency and brings QKD closer to becoming the first widespread technology based
on quantum physics.
In a nodal QKD network multiple trusted repeaters
are connected via point-to-point links between a quantum
transmitter (Alice) and a quantum receiver (Bob). These
point-to-point links can be realised with long-distance op-
tical fibres, and in the future might even utilize ground to
satellite communication[6–8]. While point-to-point con-
nections are suitable to form a backbone quantum core
network to bridge long distances, they are less suitable
to provide the last-mile service needed to give a multi-
tude of users access to this QKD infrastructure. Recon-
figurable optical networks based on optical switches or
wavelength-division multiplexing have been suggested to
achieve more flexible network structures[3, 9–12], how-
ever, they also require the installation of a full QKD sys-
tem per user, which is prohibitively expensive for many
applications.
Giving a multitude of users access to the nodal QKD
network requires point-to-multipoint connections. In
modern fibre-optic networks point-to-multipoint connec-
tions are often realized passively using components such
as optical power splitters[13]. Single photon QKD with
the sender positioned at the network node and the re-
ceiver at the user premises[14] lends itself naturally to
a passive multi-user network (see Fig. 1a). However,
this downstream implementation has two major short-
comings. Firstly, every user in the network requires a
single photon detector, which are often expensive and
difficult to operate. And secondly, it is not possible to
deterministically address a user. All detectors therefore
have to operate at the same speed as the transmitter in
order not to miss photons, which means most of the de-
tector bandwidth is unused.
Here, we show that both problems associated with a
downstream implementation can be overcome with a con-
ceptual advancement: the most valuable resource should
be shared by all users and should operate at full capac-
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FIG. 1: Downstream and upstream quantum access network.
a In a downstream configuration the quantum transmitter is
positioned at the network node. The transmitted quantum
key is randomly directed to one of the quantum receivers by
a passive optical splitter. Each user needs a single-photon
detector and the key is not distributed deterministically. b
The upstream configuration requires only a single detector
at the network node. The quantum transmitters share this
detector by ensuring that only photons from one transmitter
at a time reach the receiver.
ity. We propose and demonstrate an upstream quantum
access network, in which the transmitters are placed at
the end user location and a common receiver is placed at
the network node as shown in Fig. 1b. A careful study of
the cross-talk between senders arising from the shared re-
ceiver topology shows that operation with up to 64 users
is feasible, which we demonstrate by performing multi-
user QKD over a 1x64 passive optical splitter. The re-
sults presented here for the first time highlight a practical
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2and viable approach to extend the scope of QKD appli-
cations to many more users. Our approach would also
be advantageous in a fully quantum network in which
a quantum relay or repeater is located at the common
node.
One of the main challenges for realizing an upstream
quantum access network is to develop independently
operating quantum transmitters which exchange secure
keys efficiently with the receiver in parallel. For exam-
ple, active stabilisation in QKD systems is typically im-
plemented at the receiver side[15]. In our scheme, how-
ever, the receiver is a reference for multiple transmitters
and phase changes hence have to be pre-compensated by
each user individually. Figure 2 shows a schematic of our
experimental setup (see also methods). We developed
two flexible quantum transmitters which can operate at
varying repetition rates and contain all the stabilisation
components necessary for continuous operation. They
also include additional polarisation control elements to
achieve higher key rates (see methods). At the centre of
the quantum network is a passive optical splitter which
connects multiple transmitters to the receiver. The fibre
distance between transmitters and receiver was chosen
to be close to the maximum distance defined for gigabit
passive optical networks in the International Telecom-
munication Union (ITU) standardization document[13].
We use a phase-encoding BB84 QKD protocol with de-
coy states[16–19] implemented with asymmetric Mach-
Zehnder interferometers and intensity modulators. The
quantum receiver decodes the phase information with a
matching interferometer and uses two high-speed detec-
tors based on avalanche photo-diodes to detect the single
photons with a rate of 1 GHz[20, 21]. We implement
phase encoding as it is robust against fluctuations on the
transmission channel and allows for a simple stabilisation
mechanism.
In order to share a single-photon detector between mul-
tiple transmitters we adopt a novel and efficient scheme
which allows continuous and stable exchange of keys
necessary to reduce the detrimental effect of finite size
samples[22–26]. Large fluctuations during a key session
will reduce the amount of sifted bits that are transmitted
and therefore reduce the amount of secure bits that can
be distilled after privacy amplification. In our scheme
all quantum transmitters operate continuously in paral-
lel allowing for uninterrupted key sessions. We operate
each transmitter at a fraction of the speed of the re-
ceiver, for example 1 GHz/8=125 MHz in an 8 user net-
work. The transmitters are synchronised such that their
pulses fall into subsequent detection time slots and can
be clearly assigned to each user as shown in Fig. 1b. This
scheme has two main advantages: Firstly, polarization,
phase, and synchronisation tracking is done continuously
by each QKD transmitter against the common quantum
receiver, thus allowing stable operation of the quantum
network. And secondly, the transmitter can be realised
with simpler electronics and optics due to the lower op-
erational speed.
In a first experiment we demonstrate stable operation
over 12 hours of a 1x8 quantum access network which is
populated by 2 users. We operate both transmitters at
125 MHz and use a passive 1x8 splitter to combine their
signals, the total transmission loss including the split-
ter is 13.6 dB (14 dB) for transmitter 1 (transmitter 2).
Counts in each detection gate are allocated either to one
of the transmitters or identified as an empty gate depend-
ing on their timing information. In a 20 minute key ses-
sion we record almost 300 Mbit of counts per transmitter.
Figure 3a shows the quantum bit error ratio (QBERs)
and secure bit rate for each key session. Although as-
signed to a specific transmitter, both the transmitter and
the receiver subsystem contribute to the QBER. Due to
the low QBERs (transmitter 1: 1.28 %, transmitter 2:
1.53 %) we can exchange secure bits very efficiently with
an average secure bit rate of 47.5 kbps (43.1 kbps) for
transmitter 1 (transmitter 2). Continuous operation over
a month would allow unconditionally secure one-time-
pad encryption of more than 10 GByte of data for each
user, which is enough for example to protect over one
hundred thousand emails.
The key rate can be increased further by the use of
wavelength-division multiplexing optics instead of pas-
sive splitters because of the lower insertion loss of these
devices. We demonstrate this in a second experiment
by replacing the 1x8 splitter with an 8 channel thin-film
dense-wavelength-division multiplexing module. The
specified loss of the multiplexing module of ≈ 2.5 dB
is 5 times lower than for the 1x8 splitter and accordingly
leads to a proportional increase of the count rate. In
this experiment the quantum transmitters do not need
to be modified as we designed the emission wavelengths
of transmitter 1 and transmitter 2 to coincide with chan-
nels 33 (1550.92 nm) and 34 (1550.12 nm) of the ITU
grid, respectively. Figure 3b shows the resulting QBER
and secure bit rate for each key session. In addition to
the higher transmission rate, the ratio of dark counts to
photon counts decreases leading to a reduction of the
QBER (transmitter 1: 1.06 %, transmitter 2: 1.17 %)
and therefore to an even higher increase of the secure bit
rate (6-fold), corresponding to almost 100 GByte of key
material per month (transmitter 1: 303 kbps, transmitter
2: 259 kbps).
We can extrapolate the performance of a network with
more users by studying the cross-talk between two trans-
mitters in detail. To determine the cross-talk we measure
the average count rate of one transmitter with the other
transmitter either on or off Con and Coff , respectively. As
shown in the inset of Fig. 4a the transmitters are oper-
ated at 125 MHz allowing us to vary the gate separation
between them. From this data we extract how many
spurious detection events the second transmitter (green)
causes in the detection gates allocated to the first trans-
mitter (blue). Figure 4a displays the relative count rate
increase (Con −Coff)/Coff for various gate separations of
transmitter 1 and 2. There are two effects contributing
to the increase: Firstly, detection of pulses sent from the
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FIG. 2: Experimental setup. Two quantum transmitters are connected to a single quantum receiver via a passive optical splitter
and fibre spools. Each transmitter encodes bit and basis information on short laser pulses with an asymmetric Mach-Zehnder
interferometer. The intensity of the pulses is modulated with an intensity modulator (IM) and attenuated to the single photon
level. A polarisation controller (PC) pre-compensates the polarisation and a fibre-Bragg-grating (FBG) compensates pulse
broadening in the fibre. The receiver decodes the phase information with a matching interferometer. The two outputs of this
interferometer are connected to single-photon detectors which operate at 1 GHz.
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FIG. 3: Stable operation of quantum access network. a Quan-
tum bit error ratio (QBER) (transmitter 1: filled blue dia-
monds, transmitter 2: filled green triangles) and secure bit
rate (transmitter 1: open blue circles, transmitter 2: open
green squares) for each 20 minute key session in a network
supporting 8 users with a 1x8 passive optical splitter. b
QBER and secure bit rate for each 20 minute key session in an
8 user network using dense wavelength-division multiplexing
(DWDM) optics.
second transmitter causes afterpulses in the gate periods
of the first transmitter. This leads to an increase of the
count rate per added user independent of the gate sepa-
ration by pA/N as indicated by the dashed line, where pA
is the afterpulse probability of the detector and N is the
number of users the network supports. Secondly, smaller
gate separation between transmitter 1 and 2 increases
the cross-talk which is most likely due to late arrival of
photons or ringing of the detector electronics.
Using the cross-talk data we simulate how the key
rate of a single transmitter changes when more users
are added to the network (see also methods). Figure 4b
shows logarithmic colour-scale plots of the secure bit rate
per user as a function of fibre distance from the trans-
mitters to the node and number of active users in the
network. We simulate the rate for various network capac-
ities which are given by the splitting ratio of the passive
optical splitter installed in the system. For the simu-
lation we assume that each active transmitter operates
with 1 GHz/N and that the fibre distance to the node
is the same for all transmitters. The data shows clearly
that even for a 64 user network, which inherently has a
loss of approximately 20 dB from the 1x64 splitter, secure
transmission is possible up to the maximum distance for
gigabit passive optical networks (GPON) of 20 km with
all users active. In networks supporting fewer users there
is a margin to allow longer fibre distances or, correspond-
ingly, higher loss in the system.
To verify this result experimentally we switch to
500 MHz operation of the transmitters and vary the split-
ting ratio from 1x8 to 1x64. Operation at 500 MHz with
two transmitters allows us to emulate a fully occupied
network as photon detections are possible in all detector
time slots. Figure 4c displays the estimated key rate per
user based on the measured secure bit rates of transmit-
ter 1 and 2 and how it compares to the expected value
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FIG. 4: Quantum access network with varying capacity. a Relative count rate increase due to cross-talk between the transmitters
as a function of gate separation. The dashed line indicates the limit given by detector afterpulses. Error bars correspond to one
standard deviation of three consecutive measurements. Inset: Measurement principle (see text). b Simulation of the secure bit
rate per user as a function of fibre distance and number of active users in the network for various network capacities (see text
and methods). c Secure bit rate per user in a quantum network with varying capacity estimated from a two user measurement
at 500 MHz.
from the simulation. For the key rate estimation we add
the key rate of the two transmitters and divide it by the
network capacity. The data confirms the result obtained
from the simulation as it demonstrates that a 64 user
network is feasible with our scheme.
In conclusion, we have demonstrated that passive op-
tical networks have the potential to scale up the num-
ber of users in a nodal QKD network. We have shown
that the reduction of the secure key rate accompany-
ing a time-division multiplexing approach can be greatly
mitigated by using a high speed single-photon detector.
The network node in our scheme acts as a receiver and
has to be trusted intrinsically, however, techniques such
as classical secret sharing[27] or measurement-device-
independent QKD[28] might be used to relax this re-
quirement in the future. It might also be possible to
combine classical data transport on the same fibre in
quantum-secured access networks[29]. Quantum access
networks could initially find application for example to
protect smart community or smart grid networks allow-
ing authenticated data collection from multiple locations
in a critical infrastructure network[30].
I. METHODS
A. Experimental setup.
Each quantum transmitter consists of a source of short
laser pulses, an intensity modulator (IM), an asymmetric
Mach-Zehnder interferometer including a phase modula-
tor in one arm, a fibre Bragg grating (FBG), an attenu-
ator and a polarisation controller (see Fig. 2). The laser
source is a distributed feedback laser generating laser
pulses shorter than 50 ps with a selectable repetition rate
of up to 1 GHz. The wavelengths of transmitter 1 and
transmitter 2 are tuned to coincide with channels 33 and
34, respectively, of the grid defined by the International
Telecommunication Union (ITU). The intensity modu-
lator in combination with the attenuator at the output
sets the power of each pulse to one of three power levels
necessary for the decoy protocol16−19: 0.5 photons/pulse
for signal pulses, 0.1 photons/pulse for decoy pulses, and
0.0002 photons/pulse for vacuum pulses. We send signal,
decoy, and vacuum pulses with probabilities of 98.83 %,
0.78 %, and 0.39 %, respectively.
The asymmetric Mach-Zehnder interferometer is made
of off-the-shelf fibre optic components and the length dif-
ference between long and short arms is matched to the
5receiver interferometer with a tunable optical delay. The
components do not require temperature stabilisation or
vibration isolation. Drifts of the relative phase between
long and short arm of the interferometer with respect to
the receiver interferometer are compensated by applying
a DC bias across the phase modulator. Each transmitter
compensates the phase difference individually and inde-
pendently of other users in the network. No compen-
sation is necessary in the receiver interferometer, which
acts as a phase reference. The output beam splitter of
the transmitter interferometer and the input beam split-
ter of the receiver interferometer are polarising to direct
the photons into the correct arm of the receiver interfer-
ometer, thus avoiding a 3 dB penalty when using polari-
sation insensitive interferometers. We therefore addition-
ally pre-compensate the polarisation of the transmitted
pulses with a polarisation controller (PC) to achieve max-
imum count rate at the receiver. The fibre Bragg grat-
ing compensates pulse broadening across the fibre link to
avoid a further 1.5 dB decrease of the count rate.
The quantum receiver consists of a reference Mach-
Zehnder interferometer which decodes the phase infor-
mation of the pulses sent from the transmitters and de-
tects the photons with InGaAs single-photon avalanche
photodiodes (APDs) with a rate of 1 GHz using a self-
differencing technique20,21. The APDs are operated at a
temperature of −30 deg C. A typical detection efficiency
is 15 %, with 8×10−6 dark counts per gate, and an after-
pulse probability of 4.5 %. Detection events are sorted
into N time bins, where N is the number of users the
network supports. Each transmitter is aligned relative
to a master clock from Bob such that their photons coin-
cide with a specific time bin and can be clearly assigned
to a user. A variable time delay implemented in each
transmitter allows to control the alignment continuously
with a feedback signal generated from the detector count
rate.
B. Secure key rate.
We implement the standard BB84 protocol with de-
coy states in our setup. The quantum transmitter pre-
pares one of four phase states 0, pi2 , pi, and
3pi
2 with equal
probabilities and the receiver chooses either phase 0 or
pi
2 . All events with non-matching basis are discarded in
the sifting process. Based on the individual error rates
of signal, decoy, and vacuum states we estimate single-
photon parameters for each user individually. Our secu-
rity analysis26 takes finite-size effects into account23−25
and achieves bit rates close to the asymptotic limit for key
sessions of 20 min. The secure key rate is lower bounded
by the following quantity
R = {Q1[1−H(e1)]−QfEC(e)H(e) +Q0 −∆}/t . (1)
Here Q1 is the estimated number of sifted bits from
single-photon states, H(e1) the binary entropy function
of the estimated error rate of those bits, Q the total num-
ber of sifted bits, fEC the error correction efficiency which
is set to 1.1, e is the QBER of sifted bits, Q0 is the es-
timated number of sifted bits originating from vacuum
pulses, and t is the key session time. Finite size effects
are included by subtracting ∆ which is proportional to√
Q and to log2(
−1), where , equal to 10−10 in our sys-
tem, is related to the overall security of the system26.
Parameters of the protocol such as decoy level and de-
coy probability have to be chosen carefully to achieve
optimal secure key rates. For example, the estimation of
Q1 depends directly on the chosen decoy photon flux and
probability. We simulate the achievable secure key rates
in advance to select suitable parameters for the experi-
ment. For convenience we use one set of parameters for
all measurements presented here which we found to lead
to stable results in all considered configurations.
C. Simulation.
We simulate the secure key rate per user in a network
which is populated by more than two users based on mea-
sured experimental parameters. For the simulation we as-
sume that each active transmitter operates with 1 GHz/N
and that the fibre distance to the node is the same for
all transmitters. Starting point is calculating the proba-
bility to get an error count for a single transmitter in an
otherwise empty network using
ηerr = η
(
eopt +
pA
2N
)
+
pD
2
. (2)
Here, eopt is the optical error due to encoding imper-
fections, pA is the afterpulse probability and pD the dark
count probability of the detector, and the detection prob-
ability η is given by η = µ10−0.2L/10lsplηBob, with µ the
photon flux, L the total fibre length in kilometers, lspl
the splitter loss, and ηBob the detection efficiency of the
receiver. We use the following parameters in the simula-
tion: eopt = 0.5 %, pA = 4.5 %, pD = 2 · 8 × 10−6, and
ηBob = 9.04 %.
Adding more users to the network will increase the er-
ror rate due to cross-talk between the users. The QBER
including cross-talk counts is then given by
e =
ηerr +
1
2pX(n− 1)η
η
(
1 + pAN
)
+ pD + pX(n− 1)η
(3)
with n the number of active users in the network. The
average count rate increase per added user
pX =
1.9%
N − 1 +
pA
N
. (4)
is extracted from the data shown in Fig. 4a by taking
both the base increase of pA/N and the enhanced cross-
talk at short gate separation into account. For the split-
ter loss lspl we use our measured values of 9.7 dB, 13 dB,
616.1 dB, and 19.5 dB for 1x8, 1x16, 1x32, and 1x64 split-
ting ratio, respectively.
The secure key rate is determined from a refined analy-
sis calculating the QBER for all three signal levels of the
decoy protocol. We use the same routine as for the exper-
imental data to determine the secure key rate from these
values. For the 32 and 64 user network we increased the
key session length from 20 min to 2 h and 12 h, respec-
tively, to compensate for the decreasing sample size due
to the slower operation of the transmitter. Our measure-
ments shown in Fig. 3 clearly indicate that longer key
sessions are feasible. For the comparison of simulation
and experiment shown in Fig. 4c we adopt the simula-
tion to account for the non-equal fibre distances of the
two transmitters, as well as the higher operational speed
leading to different sample sizes compared to Fig. 4b.
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